

SECRET/EXDIS

SALT TWO-I  
US/USSR Plenary Meeting No. 4  
US Mission  
1100 Hours, December 1, 1972

Persons Present

|                               |                              |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Ambassador Smith              | Minister Semenov             |
| Ambassador Farley             | General Trusov               |
| Mr. Nitze                     | Mr. Shchukin                 |
| General Allison               | Mr. Pleshakov                |
| Dr. Garthoff                  | Mr. Grinevsky                |
| Mr. Graybeal                  | Mr. Chulitsky                |
| Mr. Shaw                      | General Beletsky             |
| Mr. Earle                     | Capt. Mazerkin               |
| Capt. Matthes                 | Mr. Evseev                   |
| Dr. Weiler                    | Mr. Gorokhov                 |
| Mr. Stoertz                   | Mr. Trepykhalin              |
| Dr. Zemach                    | Col. Starodubov              |
| Mr. Ausland                   | Mr. Smolin                   |
| Mr. Shearer                   | Col. Budantsev               |
| Mr. Arensburger (Interpreter) | Mr. Sudonkin                 |
|                               | Mr. Bratchikov (Interpreter) |
|                               | Lt. Col. Chesnokov           |

---

Ambassador Smith opened the meeting by welcoming the Soviet Delegation. He then gave the floor to Minister Semenov.

Minister Semenov then delivered his prepared statement.

Ambassador Smith stated that the U.S. Delegation would study the Soviet Delegation's statement with the care it deserved. He then delivered his prepared statement.

Ambassador Smith asked if Minister Semenov had any further material he would like to present.

Minister Semenov said he did not.

Ambassador Smith raised the question of the date of the next meeting and proposed that it be held Tuesday, December 5, 1972 at 1100 hours at the Soviet Residence.

Minister Semenov agreed with this proposal and the meeting was adjourned by Ambassador Smith.

Drafted by: L.D. Weiler *LDW*  
Approved by: John P. Shaw  
R. L. Garthoff *RJG*

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SMITH  
December 1, 1972

I

Mr. Minister, I wish to take a moment at the start to comment on a point you raised during our Plenary session on November 28th. You said, " . . . at one time the U.S. Delegation addressed the question of not deploying strategic ballistic missiles on airborne or waterborne platforms, or on fixed or mobile devices on the seabed or the ocean floor." Your statement gives the impression that the U.S. looked upon or discussed each of these constraints in a favorable light. Such an impression is not wholly correct. The U.S. side has not proposed a ban on strategic ballistic missiles on airborne platforms. Our recollection is that it was the Soviet side which raised this issue.

II

Today I shall present some additional U.S. views on the limitation of the overall levels of strategic offensive systems. As I have already explained, we believe that land-based ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers--those systems central to the strategic equation--should be limited in their aggregate. The establishment of an equal aggregate ceiling for each side

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

on these central systems is fundamental to the achievement of a more comprehensive and permanent agreement on strategic offensive arms. Equality further requires that for a permanent agreement there be equal ceilings on the number of ICBM launchers and on the total ICBM throw weight of each side. Within these limits, appropriate provision would be made for substitution of weapon units of one kind for units of another kind.

### III

An objective of SALT is to limit strategic arms in a manner which will increase the security of both sides by enhancing strategic stability. Stability is better served if both sides move toward equality in the levels of the aggregate of central systems, in the number of ICBM launchers, and in throw weight of the ICBM force through reductions, rather than through increases, in strategic arms.

Uncertainties in each side's assessment of the future strategic programs of the other side have been a principal factor responsible for the arms competition in the past. Reductions of central strategic systems would help reduce some of these uncertainties and lead toward a more stable situation.

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

Reductions, under appropriate conditions, would promote a more stable balance and would enhance the confidence of both sides in their retaliatory capabilities. Specifically, a substantial reduction of total ICBM throw weight would reduce the capacity of ICBM forces that could be deployed within a given numerical launcher limit and would do so in a manner which diminishes the impact of potential technological advances.

Furthermore, the ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of an extensive anti-ballistic missile defense, thus reducing the requirements for offensive strategic force capacity. Your opening statement in this session indicates that we are in agreement on this point.

#### IV

The actual method or methods of reduction to reach the equal agreed ceilings could be accomplished in various ways.

Questions of the rate of reduction and the time period during which reductions would be effected are also relevant.

We propose that the Work Program include a topic covering these questions.

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

We would welcome your views on the value of reductions in the process of reaching equality, and how you believe reductions can be effected.

V

It is our belief that the issue of reductions should be given full consideration during the present negotiations. We both recognize that the reduction of arms would allow considerable savings in the long run, both in material and human resources, which could be applied to the benefit of our peoples. Moreover, reductions would signify plainly to the world a reversal in the direction of the arms competition.

SECRET

SECRET-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

SEMENOV STATEMENT, December 1, 1972

As you know, both Governments attach great importance to those positive results in the limitation of strategic armaments, which are nailed down in the agreements signed May 26, 1972. The new stage of negotiations has been given the task of finding ways to reach agreement on more comprehensive measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, which must extend to those areas that are not covered by the Interim Agreement.

It is obvious that the solution of this problem must be approached in terms of the need [to find] the most effective solution that would reliably block the channels for strategic arms competition and contribute to enhancing the security of the two sides.

Now that the Interim Agreement has established certain limitations on land-based ICBMs and on SLBMs, it is obvious that the area in which, along with the other areas we mentioned earlier, measures to limit strategic offensive arms are required, is that of strategic offensive air weapons.

SECRET-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

In the course of discussions at previous phases of the negotiations it became evident that the positions of the sides coincided as concerns the need to limit strategic air systems. The USSR and U.S. Delegations were in agreement as regards the fact that these systems are part of the composition of strategic armaments in terms of our negotiations and, as shown by the initial meetings of the new stage of negotiations, at present, too, the sides believe that strategic air systems must be limited in an agreement on more comprehensive measures to limit strategic offensive arms. In our view this gives us grounds to hope that if both sides follow the principle of equal security and no unilateral advantages, it will be possible to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of limiting strategic offensive air weapons.

I think the experience of both sides indicates that under conditions of modern scientific and technological development, when strategic armaments as a whole as well as individual types of weapons can be developed and improved quickly, accelerated development of one type of weapon or another by one side inevitably evokes an adequate response [by the other], and all this by no means leads to increasing the security of the former, but rather the opposite.

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

Therefore the timeliness and importance of this question from the point of view of solving the problem of limiting strategic arms as we have been instructed to do, cannot but be viewed from the angle of striving for further expansion of areas of agreement and consolidation of the positive aspects inherent in the agreements which have already entered into force.

Evidently none of us has any doubt that agreement on limiting strategic offensive air weapons would be a substantial contribution to solving the problem of further limitation of strategic offensive arms.

This naturally also raises the question of limiting the number of strategic bombers at the disposal of the sides, for the absence of that kind of quantitative limitations would leave a path open for building up a pool of strategic bombers, i. e., for continuing the race in strategic offensive arms, although in a different sphere, to be sure. Therefore we believe that the proposal to limit the number of strategic bomber aircraft to agreed levels for both sides corresponds to the objectives of our negotiations.

SECRET-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3



Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

Since both sides have spoken in favor of reaching agreement on quantitative limitation of strategic bombers, the USSR Delegation believes that we should make efforts to search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of the principle of equal security and no unilateral advantages.

It should be noted that modern strategic aircraft can deliver nuclear bombs as well as air-to-ground missiles with nuclear warheads whose yield is commensurate to that of other strategic offensive weapons. In essence, modern strategic aircraft, armed with air-to-ground missiles, can be regarded as airborne platforms for launching these missiles, which are capable of striking targets on the territory of the other side.

It is therefore natural that when discussing the question of strategic offensive air weapons, not only the bombers themselves, but also the nuclear weapons systems placed thereon should be borne in mind. It follows that limitation of the nuclear armament of strategic aircraft, whether nuclear bombs or air-to-ground missiles with nuclear warheads, is of great importance. Such an approach would make possible fuller and more thorough consideration of the question of limiting this type of weapon in line with the principle of equal security.

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

SECRET-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

On this basis the Soviet side submits a proposal to ban the use of strategic bombers for delivery of nuclear weapons, including air-to-ground missiles. Reaching agreement on this matter would be a major step toward resolving the questions of limiting strategic offensive air weapons.

With respect to the limitation of strategic offensive air weapons, the question of limitations on the development of new types of strategic aircraft and their armaments also cannot but be a subject for consideration. Indeed, resolution of this question would enhance the effectiveness of an agreement on limiting strategic offensive air weapons and would make more definite the prospects for maintaining strategic stability in this respect as well. It is clear that limitations on the development of new types of strategic offensive air weapons would preclude the potential possibility that even more destructive air weapons systems could appear, which, when equipped with nuclear charges, could have an unfavorable influence upon the strategic situation. In this connection the Soviet side proposes a ban on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic aircraft, limiting the sides to modernization of existing bombers, without the right

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3

to convert them into delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, including air-to-ground missiles with nuclear warheads.

You know that the capabilities of strategic aircraft can be substantially increased by equipping them with long-range air-to-ground missiles. In essence, in the absence of a ban on such missiles, equipping aircraft with them can lead to an unfavorable development and to upsetting strategic stability, since the capabilities of long-range air-to-ground missiles, particularly in view of the possible dynamics of their technical development, can be commensurate with certain other strategic offensive weapons that are already limited by the agreement which has entered into force, or with those which both sides recognize need to be limited.

Therefore we propose also a ban on the development, testing and deployment of long-range air-to-ground missiles.

We proceed from the premise that the proposals set forth by the Soviet side are of great and constructive significance for the solution of the problem of more comprehensive limitation of strategic offensive arms. Reciprocal commitments by the sides along the lines of the proposals set forth would constitute substantial measures of quantitative and qualitative limitation of an important type of strategic offensive arms.

These proposals fully meet the requirement of equal

security and no unilateral advantages and are thereby aimed at maintaining strategic stability, which would reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

The USSR Delegation expresses the hope that the U.S. side will take a positive attitude toward these Soviet proposals, with a view to ensuring necessary constructive movement toward reaching mutually acceptable agreement on more comprehensive measures to limit strategic offensive arms.

Mr. Ambassador, your statement of November 24 emphasized the need promptly to take up the matter of agreed procedures for the destruction, dismantling and replacement of strategic weapons systems or their components in accordance with the provisions of the existing agreements.

I think that it would serve the interests of advancing our negotiations if the U.S. side were to set forth its concrete proposals in as much detail as possible, particularly on the matter of a possible procedure for replacing older types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers on older submarines by SLBM launchers on modern submarines, as provided in the

SECRET-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3  
Interim Agreement. In this connection the approach to  
the substance of this matter is of interest.

SECRET-EXDIS

Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP80T00294A000300100008-3